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Abstract
With the creation of the Euro, the Spanish economy established an exchange rate regime
similar to that adopted by many emerging economies during the 1990s. At the same time, the
Eurozone as a whole adopted a currency system with features similar to the U.S. currency
regime. In emerging economies, as in the U.S. economy, the adoption of these models was
accompanied by strong growth in capital inflows, as well as severe financial (mostly banking)
and/or macroeconomic (mostly trade) imbalances. Several authors have linked capital
inflows with imbalances as cause and effect. This work uses some of those arguments, along
with statistical data on the characteristics and evolution of capital inflows registered by the
Spanish economy, and by the Eurozone as a whole, in order to propose a causal link
between post-Euro exchange rate regimes adopted in Spain, capital inflows, and the
imbalances that preceded the financial crisis of 2008.
Key words: exchange rate regimes, capital inflows, financial risks, trade imbalances, crisis,
Eurozone, Spain.
Clasificación JEL: F32, F36, O52.

1. Introduction
Disparate strands found within the economic literature have linked financial crises with the
massive reception of foreign capital, as well as with certain characteristics of monetary and
exchange rate regimes, both as regards the U.S. in the early 21st century and for emerging
economies in the 1990s.
More specifically, several studies (which we shall term the “global imbalances" literature)
have related the U.S. crisis of 2007-08, which was preceded by significant banking fragilities
and trade imbalances, with a monetary and currency regime that optimized the continuous
attraction of international capital. At the same time, an extensive literature (hereafter the "too
much of a good thing" strand) has argued that fixed exchange rate regimes in emerging
economies in the 1990s facilitated the massive inflow of foreign capital, thus fostering
banking fragility and trade deterioration.
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), member countries experienced
the anomalous overlap of two exchange rate regimes. In relation to the rest of the world, the
Eurozone presented a floating exchange rate regime with characteristics similar to that of the
U.S. during the period of "global imbalances". On the other hand, for intra-Eurozone
relations, member countries and especially peripheral countries like Spain presented a fixed
exchange rate regime comparable to those adopted in emerging economies during the
1990s.
Given the similarities between the Eurozone and the U.S., on one side, and peripheral
Eurozone countries and emerging economies on the other, an alternative explanation of
financial crises in peripheral Eurozone countries seems worth pursuing. However, we know
of no works explicitly linking exchange rate regimes with massive capital inflows into the
Eurozone and/or Spain, or linking that entry of capital with the emergence of financial and
macroeconomic imbalances (as has been done in the cases of both the U.S. and emerging
economies).
The specific and original goals of this work are therefore as follow. First, we seek to confirm
similarities between the monetary and exchange rate regimes in the Eurozone and U.S. in
the decade prior to the financial crisis, as well as between exchange rate regimes in
peripheral Eurozone economies (particularly Spain) and emerging economies in the 1990s,
prior to their own financial crises.
Second, we attempt to explain the massive capital inflows into the Eurozone and Spain by
virtue of the interaction of the anomalous dual exchange rate regimes. We hope to illustrate
that, in the Eurozone, the introduction of a floating exchange rate (along with financial
liberalization and autonomous monetary policies that held interest rates at very low levels)
facilitated the boom in international capital inflows, just as in the U.S. Meanwhile, in the
peripheral economies of the Eurozone, and in Spain in particular, the introduction of fixed
exchange rates together with full financial liberalization and the loss of monetary autonomy
formed the basis of further massive capital inflows from within the Eurozone itself.
Third, we present the internal difficulties present in the Spanish economy – banking fragility
and trade deterioration – as not only the cause but also a consequence of massive capital
inflows from abroad. The literature on the Spanish financial crisis has tended to suggest that
economic growth was unsustainable, due to imbalances that required external financing for
their sustenance. Here we suggest a different direction of causality: from capital inflows to
internal imbalances, which may have overlapped and reinforced the other (from imbalances
to capital inflows).
These three goals can be united into a single general hypothesis, well illustrated by a
metaphor used by Wade (2000) in describing the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. He
characterized crisis as resulting from a “wheels within wheels” mechanism: internal
imbalances in East Asia had resulted from the wheels of domestic credit intermediation, itself
moved by the wheels of international capital inflows. Here our overall hypothesis is that
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internal imbalances (and ultimately the crisis) in Spain may be explained by a mechanism of
“wheels within wheels within wheels”: the wheels of domestic credit intermediation moved by
the wheels of capital inflows from the Eurozone, moved by the wheels of international capital
entering Europe.
This work is based on the logical argument of the aforementioned literature strands (on
"global imbalances" and "too much of a good thing"), as well as the analysis of capital flows
and financial positions in the Eurozone and Spain.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present the "global imbalances" literature as
applied to the U.S. and analyze the Eurozone through its perspective (features of the
monetary and exchange rate regime and its possible pull effects on capital inflows). Second,
we examine the "too much of a good thing" literature as it refers to the emerging economies
in the 1990s in order to analyze the Spanish case: the exchange rate regime and its potential
impact on capital inflows and financial/banking and macroeconomic/trade imbalances.
2. “Global imbalances”: Is the Eurozone similar to the U.S.?
2.1. The U.S.: currency regime, capital inflows, and imbalances
2.1.1. Currency regime and capital inflows
The Mundell-Fleming trilemma establishes the inability to pursue three policies
simultaneously: fixed exchange rates, autonomous domestic monetary policy, and free crossborder movements of capital. While this trilemma relates more closely to small and open
economies, the U.S. has chosen to preserve an autonomous monetary policy combined with
financial liberalization and a floating currency.
Theses like those in Dooley et al. (2003) on “Bretton Woods II”, or in Bernanke (2005) on the
international saving glut, argue that the combination of financial liberalization with a floating
exchange rate does not guarantee the autonomy of U.S. monetary policy, given the particular
role of the dollar as the international reserve currency. Following Triffin (1960), Bernanke
argued that if U.S. monetary policy is overly restrictive, international demand for liquidity
would be unsatisfied. Hence, the monetary authority is forced to opt for expansionary
policies, which boost domestic demand. It is this “obligation” that feeds huge external
imbalances, offering optimal conditions for the entry of portfolio capital from a new periphery
that generates savings via the export-oriented growth model, and which values profitable
investments (private sector assets) as well as stowing away wealth in a safe currency (public
sector assets).
However, Roubini (2005) and others (i.e., Eichengreen, 2004) question the passive and
stabilizing character attributed by Dooley and Bernanke to the U.S. economy. These authors
believe in the autonomy of American monetary policy and agree with Bernanke that the
stimuli toward domestic demand through borrowing has indeed been behind both the
attraction of foreign capital and global imbalances; however, they consider that said stimuli
have not responded to external factors, but rather to the Federal Reserve’s addressing of
domestic problems. Palley (2013) proposes something similar: that low interest rates and
fiscal deficits were aimed not merely at reviving the economy (following the technological
stock crisis) but also at mitigating the slowdown in aggregate demand caused by rising
inequality and stagnant wages. Meanwhile, Bibow (2010) takes this argument further by
stating that the overabundance of U.S. dollars (the dollar glut) caused by monetary
expansion is the source of global imbalances, in that excess dollars moved abroad and then
returned to the U.S. as savings.
Bibow’s thesis places the epicenter of imbalance in the monetary-credit laxity of the U.S.,
then goes on to suggest that in economies with reserve currencies, the connection between
the monetary-currency regime (financial liberalization, floating exchange rate, and
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independent monetary policy) and capital inflows is, paradoxically, reinforced when monetary
autonomy is used to keep interest rates low.
2.2.2. Capital inflows and domestic imbalances
Following Bibow’s thesis, as well as Bernanke’s and Dooley’s, monetary-currency conditions
in the U.S. led to an inflow of international capital. But can a causal relationship be
established between that inflow and the financially destabilizing dynamics at work in the U.S.
economy? In the literature on the 2008 crisis, we find three arguments in support of this idea.
The first argument concentrates on the positive net balance of the financial account, due to
international demand for safe assets denominated in dollars. Under this approach, the
appeal of U.S. assets can capture savings without raising interest rates, thus generating an
excess liquidity in the system that can be drained outwards only partially. At the same time, it
is argued that monetary laxity can be maintained without generating inflationary pressures
due to, among other things, capital inflows pushing the exchange rate upward, lowering of
the cost of imports, and thus reinforcing the deflationary trends coming from the new
periphery. As noted by Roubini, Bibow, and others, a feedback effect takes place whereby
low rates facilitate the generation/attraction of foreign savings, and the inflow of savings
pushes interest rates downward (decreasing interest rates being one of the main triggers of
an asset bubble and the decreasing stability of financial institutions)1.
The second argument emphasizes the recycling of safe assets into risky assets. Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2009) argue for existence of a causal link between capital inflows and
financial fragility, since demand for safe assets by international savers allowed the creation of
riskier assets, which large banks transferred to subsequent savers. This transformation of
safe assets into “toxic” assets followed three steps. First, the demand for safe assets
facilitated low-cost bank leveraging, therefore stimulating credit supply, with varying degrees
of risk. Second, loans were securitized for resale as seemingly safe financial assets. Third,
these traded securitized loans reentered the banking system, feeding credit expansion, the
creation and accumulation of toxic assets, and bubbles in those states with better conditions
for real estate development2.
Bibow (2010) also draws attention to the transformation of safe assets into risky assets as
the reason it became a financial crisis (with imbalances concentrated "within" the U.S.)
instead of a balance-of-payments crisis (as was anticipated by much of the literature on
“global imbalances”). However, Bibow does not explain said transformation by way of the
foreign demand for safe U.S. assets (as Caballero and Krishnamurthy do), but through the
‘messy’ issuance of loans and securities by U.S. financial institutions.
The third argument extends the reasoning around net inflows of capital to gross inflows.
Bank leveraging financed with foreign capital is not defined by an economy’s net financial
position: if gross capital inflows raised by the banking system are significantly large, then
excess liquidity, financial instability, and asset bubbles may follow, even if those inflows are
compensated in net terms by outflows of loans and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Therefore, the increase of gross capital inflows may appear as a cause (and as a reflection)
of uncontrolled monetary and financial dynamics. This is precisely the reasoning that leads

1 This is similar to McKinnon and Schnab’s (2004) argument concerning the Japanese crisis, whereby in Japan
the deflationary effect of financial liberalization, coupled with declining export competitiveness due to an
appreciation of the currency, brought about lower interest rates. This, in turn, combined with said financial
liberalization, led to a rapid asset inflation, which would have dramatic long-term consequences for the Japanese
economy.
2 Dooley et al. (2009) also agree that capital inflows may have deflationary effects that push interest rates down.
However, they explicitly deny the existence of a causal link between balance-of-payments imbalances and
financial crises. Instead, they argue that, in the absence of regulatory failures, credit excesses or housing bubbles
would not appear.
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Obstfeld (2012) to propose that the relationship between capital mobility and financial crises
should be studied in the light of gross flows3.
In conclusion, although Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) found a strong empirical relationship
between the accumulation of current account imbalances and housing bubbles, it is difficult
to discern whether the entry of foreign savings is cause or consequence of domestic
dynamics and imbalances (Wade, 2000). In either case, it can be stated that: (1) in mature
economies with currencies that serve as a reserve asset, the liberalization of the financial
account together with a floating currency creates conditions favorable for capital inflows; (2)
when expansionary monetary policies are added, foreign savings are attracted; (3) these
inflows contribute in turn to the use of monetary autonomy, in the direction of low interest
rates; and (4) low interest rates, combined with financial deregulation, help massive capital
inflows to become destabilizing, mainly through three channels: surplus of the financial
account, conversion of safe assets into risky assets, and an overabundance of gross capital
inflows.
2.2. The Eurozone: currency regime, capital inflows, and imbalances
2.2.1. Lines of argument from the literature on the U.S.
The European Union initially opted for the reconstruction of a monetary system very similar
to that conceived at Bretton Woods, but the ultimate decision to fully liberalize financial
transactions, arrived at in the 1980s and institutionalized in 1986 with the Single Act,
challenged the European Monetary System (EMS). The Maastricht Treaty led Europe toward
a very particular solution to the trilemma posited by Mundell. In fact, countries within the
Eurozone combined two solutions: in the Eurozone, fully fixed and irreversible exchange
rates and financial liberalization, sacrificing the sovereignty of monetary policy; and for the
rest of the world, an approach similar to that of the U.S. – a floating (reserve) currency,
financial liberalization, and "autonomy" of ECB policy.
The Euro as an international reserve currency is not fully comparable to the dollar, and the
autonomy of the ECB is severely limited by its anti-inflation mandate, despite which (and
following the three arguments previously raised) the evolution of the Eurozone’s financial
relations shows some similarities to that of American financial relations.
Looking into the net financial balance, there is substantial difference between the two
spaces, with the U.S. showing a marked deficit in its current account and the Eurozone a
state of equilibrium. However, observing only financial capital (and therefore excluding FDI),
the Eurozone shows a debit like the U.S., albeit a smaller one. That is to say, the Eurozone
has also captured savings from abroad and, like in the U.S., this effect may be related to the
characteristics of its monetary and exchange rate regime, and to evolution of interest rates
(downward) and the exchange rate (upward).
It might also be argued that, beyond net balances, the gross inflow of capital in search of
safe assets may have contributed to increasing liquidity within the Eurozone. Given the role
of banks in channeling capital from abroad, foreign capital may have contributed to their
increased issuing of credit, thus accumulating assets on their balance sheets while
facilitating the development of leverage chains with banks in other countries (chains that in
turn fed loans made to households and businesses in some Euro economies) (Borio et al.,
2011; Lane, 2013).

3 Obstfeld (2012) also warns that contagion effects are closely related to the volume of assets and liabilities
exchanged, rather than to net positions between countries. However, few studies address this field (gross inflows
and crisis) as yet, and most are focused on the cyclical behavior of capital flows (see Broner et al., 2013, for the
Spanish case).
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Regarding the management and transformation of assets, it is worth remarking that central
Euro countries captured savings from outside the Eurozone, mostly in the form of safe
portfolio assets, and transferred them to peripheral Euro-countries, mostly in the form of
loans. This suggests that, not unlike what happened in the U.S., there was a transformation
within the Eurozone of safe assets into risky assets. One might presume, à la Bilbow (2010),
that this process had its origin in the demand for financing from debtor Euro-economies – a
demand generated “from within” by low interest rates and financial liberalization. But one
might also consider, à la Dooley (2009), that the transformation of portfolio liabilities into
loans has been favored by extra-Eurozone countries seeking safe financial spaces, such as
those in central Euro countries like Germany and France.
2.2.2. Empirical support
a) Net financial balance
The financial account surplus of the U.S. in 2006 approached 6% of GDP, while the
Eurozone financial account (with the rest of the world) remained relatively balanced.
However, excluding FDI, the financial account surplus of the Eurozone increased notably
after monetary unification, in loans and especially in portfolio capital: from equilibrium to
2.5% of GDP between 2002 and 2007, reaching 5% of GDP in 2008 (Figure 1). In the U.S.,
this percentage was at 4.5% of GDP in 2008, from a peak of 6.2% in 2005.
A country-level analysis reveals that debtor positions were not limited to Southern countries.
France is a striking example: according to Waysand et al. (2010), France’s accumulated debt
was at 10% of GDP in 2008, up from its 2002 creditor position (3% of GDP). Still, the
increase in foreign debt was particularly negative in the South: in five years, Italy’s debt grew
from 15% to 20% of GDP; Greece’s from 59% to 71%; Portugal’s from 60% to 89%; and
Spain’s from 47% to 77%.
Figure 2, which refers to net portfolio financial positions vis-à-vis extra-Eurozone countries,
confirms that only financial centers such as Ireland and Luxembourg (and, more timidly, the
Netherlands and Belgium) recorded a creditor position in 2007. The remaining countries held
debtor positions outside the Eurozone, the case of Germany being especially prominent.
France and Finland, as well as Spain and Italy, also had debtor positions.
b) Gross inflows of financial capital
Strong growth of credit and portfolio capital movements is a relevant consequence of
monetary unification. Considering only investment from countries outside the Eurozone,
inflows quadrupled in just five years, accounting for 60% of U.S. inflows. When movements
between member countries are included, inflows multiplied 3.6-fold, reaching 2.35 trillion
Euros in 2007. This is an extraordinarily high figure, just 10% lower than that of the U.S. In
other words, following its creation, the Eurozone became one of the great attractors of
international financial capital4.
In terms of GDP, financial capital inflows (portfolio and loans) increased over five years from
10% to 26% of GDP in the Eurozone (or from 5% to 17%, excluding intra-Eurozone

4 As in the United States, most extra-Eurozone capital came from financial institutions located in other

leading economies. According to Eurostat statistics, more than 40% of portfolio assets held by
foreigners were owned by investors from outside the Eurozone, of which two thirds were owned
collectively by investors in the U.S. (27%), the UK (17%), Japan (11%), and Switzerland (8%). The
data offered by Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010) on total financial liabilities accumulated by the Eurozone
confirm this geographical concentration. Following the same source, three locations (the U.S., the UK,
and “offshore”) were the main destinations for investment by Euro-members outside the Eurozone,
making net flows between the Eurozone and these core areas fairly balanced.
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movements) (Figure 3). Therefore, in terms relative to GDP, the Eurozone figures were even
higher than those of the U.S. (6.5% and 13% of GDP between 2002 and 2007, respectively).
At the country level, growth of inflows was widespread, affecting dynamic economies (like
Spain and Greece) as much as others where growth and profitability expectations were
smaller. Among the latter, in Germany and France, inflows relative to GDP (including intraand extra-Eurozone) increased by ten points (from 7.5% to 17.5%) and by seven points (from
17% to 24%), respectively. Meanwhile, in Spain and Greece, said inflows reached 19% and
28%, respectively, in 2007 (rising from 10% and 14% in 2002). In smaller core economies,
and even more so in financial centers (Ireland and Luxembourg), increases were much
higher. In Belgium, for example, inflows rose from 14% to 47% of GDP, while Ireland’s and
Luxembourg’s inflows surpassed 100%.
c) Management and transformation of assets
Although capital inflows from outside the Eurozone grew strongly in all countries, most of
these investments were concentrated into five economies. Figure 4, which refers to portfolio
financial positions, shows how Germany, France, and the Netherlands hosted 60% of total
extra-Eurozone investments, while Luxembourg and Ireland (which since the creation of the
Euro have increased their role as hubs for financial intermediation) hosted another 20%. With
much smaller participation, we find the three small core countries (Belgium, Austria, and
Finland) and the four southern countries (Spain and Italy, and with even smaller positions,
Portugal and Greece), whose joint share was of only 12% (furthermore, their individual
shares decreased, especially in Italy and excepting Spain).
In contrast, Figure 4 also shows that the share of the four Southern countries was much
higher (around 30%) when observing intra-Eurozone capital inflows and, furthermore, that it
increased significantly after the creation of the Euro. Figure 5 confirms this: financial relations
of the Southern economies were strongly oriented toward the interior of the Eurozone, from
which they obtained around three quarters of incoming capital; in the remaining countries,
around half of such flows came from outside of the Eurozone.
This asymmetry among core and peripheral countries is consistent with the fact that the
portfolio-positive financial positions of Germany and France with economies outside the
Eurozone "transformed" into clearly negative balances (especially for France), vis-à-vis
Eurozone countries. This turned the two core countries (together with Belgium and, to a
lesser extent, Ireland) into large net lenders within the Eurozone, thanks in part to funding
they obtained from the rest of the world.
Spain became a main destination for such funding, along with Italy, Greece, the Netherlands
and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. Spain and Italy further combined this "internal" debt balance
with debt balances vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This was not true of Greece and Portugal,
financed only from within the Eurozone, or of the Netherlands, which held a creditor position
with countries outside the area.
This channeling of extra-Eurozone savings from Northern economies to Southern economies
reflects the transformation within the Eurozone of relatively safe assets, captured from
outside the zone by core economies, into relatively risky assets, issued by companies and
financial institutions in peripheral countries. The risk premium in the latter countries seems to
have been perceived outside the Eurozone, due to a preference for financing core
economies, but not as much inside the Eurozone.
The data we have at our disposal also suggest that risk transfer involved mostly banks, and
not only those of the peripheral economies. As shown in Figure 6, banks were the recipients
of almost all credit flows (approximately 80%) and of significant portfolio investment, giving
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rise to the conclusion that core country banks were the main recyclers of capital,
transforming it into loans to institutions located in countries with higher risk of default5.
To sum up, the trends of net balances, gross inflows, and the transformation of assets from
outside the Eurozone show interesting similarities with trends observed in the U.S., with
which the Euro Area shared a monetary and currency regime based on financial
liberalization, monetary autonomy, and the floating exchange rate of a currency capable of
serving as a reserve asset.
Thus like the U.S., the Eurozone stands out as a vast economic area, able to capture
massive amounts of financial capital from outside its borders. During the pre-crisis period,
such capital was internally channeled toward those economies with net funding needs, which
contributed along with downward interest rates to the multiplication of credit (monetary
supply) within the overall Euro area. From this perspective, financial relations within the
Eurozone were not limited to those bilateral exchanges between countries needed to settle
current account imbalances6. On the contrary: far from being a financially closed area, the
Eurozone served as a unified economy open to very active financial relations with the rest of
the world, so that neither its “internal” current account imbalances nor the financial relations
between its members could be fully understood without reference to the area’s extraEurozone financial relations, or those of its many members7.
3. “Too much of a good thing”, from emerging economies to Spain
3.1. Emerging economies: Currency regime, capital inflows, and imbalances
The “too much of a good thing” strand of literature is useful as a guide for explaining,
theoretically and empirically, how numerous emerging economies in the 1990s implemented
a monetary and exchange rate regime ideal for attracting international capital, and how
foreign capital inflows were at the origin of trade and/or financial imbalances preceding
financial crises in these economies.
Indeed, the literature focused on capital flows to emerging economies in the 1990s, while
acknowledging the presence of push factors such as falling interest rates in developed
economies (Goldstein, 1995), takes the view that these movements depended mainly on pull
factors related to liberalization of the financial account, along with fixed exchange rates (both
of which entailed the elimination of autonomy in the management of monetary policy).
This model proved perfect for attracting foreign capital for several reasons (Dooley, 1999).
First, capital (and especially volatile capital) was attracted by the (apparent) absence of
currency risk (Reinhart and Reinhart, 1998). Second, exchange rate anchors were
interpreted as a step towards orthodox fiscal and monetary policies – in other words, as an
anti-inflationary commitment by the government. Moreover, in compliance with that
commitment, many economies had to implement severe restrictive measures, such as the
raising of interest rates, which often became an additional pull factor. Third, the international
support (by the IMF, for example) for this monetary and currency regime reduced the
expected risk of default on debts taken by the countries implementing such a scheme. And,
fourth, the liberalization of international capital movements not only allowed the entry of

5 In 2007, one third of the Euro bonds and shares sold to foreign savers were issued by non-financial companies,
whereas up to 40% were issued by banks and other financial institutions. Banks prove to have been even more
relevant considering that loans became the leading (and fastest growing) type of financial instrument during the
period: Loans from abroad in 2002 accounted for just 2.4% of the Eurozone GDP (0.9% from extra-Eurozone
sources) but reached 15.5% in 2007 (10.5% extra-Eurozone).
6 Milesi-Ferreti et al. (2012) show the absence of a bilateral relationship between trade and financial exchanges.
7 Lane (2013: 5) highlights this point when he says that “the external financial linkages matter for several reasons.
Although the aggregate current account balance of the euro area has been relatively small in recent years, net
external financial flows can allow the euro area to run collective current account imbalances”.
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foreign capital, but was accompanied by deregulation of the domestic financial systems, thus
opening channels of intermediation and profitability for said foreign capital8.
Initially these inflows probably contributed to stabilization and to economic growth through
various channels (financing the current account, local businesses, non-inflationary fiscal
deficits...). But at the same time, as the “too much of a good thing” literature explains, capital
inflows fed financial-banking and/or macroeconomic-trade imbalances that, in turn,
eventually led to the outbreak of banking and/or currency crises9,10.
The financial-banking imbalances referred to in the literature may be classified as excessive
credit, market, and liquidity risks (Johnston and Ötker-Robe, 1999). Credit risks arise from
the exposure of banks to unfulfilled contracts, such as loan defaults; and risk increases when
banks take too much capital from lenders and channel it into the domestic economy through
excessive credit (over-intermediation) (McKinnon and Pill, 1997; Mishkin, 1998; and Montiel
and Reinhart, 2001). Furthermore, over-intermediation may increase market and liquidity
risks. Market risks stem from the possibility of losses due to changes in the market value of
assets and liabilities – changes that are likely to occur for assets and liabilities (such as
stocks or real estate) whose prices are subject to bubble and burst dynamics. Finally, banks
or companies suffer liquidity risks when they are unable to reduce their liabilities or increase
their assets at a reasonable cost, this cost increasing with the maturity mismatch between
liabilities and assets (meaning this risk would grow if liquid assets were transformed into less
liquid assets like real estate investments).
The reason a credit boom increases financial risks is that increasing liquidity generates
incentives towards risk-taking, therefore decreasing the quality of the investments toward
which new credits are intermediated. There can be various and multiple reasons for
excessive risk-taking to happen: from the insufficient technical capacity of bank and business
managers, to the existence of public guarantees, explicit or implicit, real or perceived (see,
for example, Calvo et al., 1993a). In any case, theses such as Minsky’s (1977 and 1986) –
and, for open economies, Kregel’s (1998) – suggest that those excessive risks are the result
of an inevitable tendency to over-indebtedness in a context of financial deregulation.
What the “too much of a good thing” literature states is that large foreign capital inflows "may
increase the magnitude, or complicate the management, of those types of risks that banks
more typically face in their domestic activities" (Johnston and Ötker-Robe, 1999: 8). Panel
studies, such as that in Ostry et al. (2011), confirm this point, portraying a strong relation
between credit booms and surges in capital inflows, as well as between credit booms that
end in crisis and surges in capital inflows.
Apart from financial-banking problems, the literature on “too much of a good thing” also
identifies macroeconomic-trade distortions as capital inflows contribute to an expansion of
monetary aggregates, which results in an increase in domestic demand. Domestic demand
growth culminates, in turn, in deteriorating current account balances and/or inflation (Montiel,
1999). Inflation worsens – as do consequent current account imbalances, via the
deterioration in price-competitiveness – if there is an increase in demand for non-tradable
goods; while the current account can be directly damaged if the increase in demand is for
tradable goods (see Goldstein, 1995; and Montiel, 1995 and 1999).
As economic policy proves unable to effectively prevent financial and/or macroeconomic
problems, capital inflows end up threatening exchange rate stability. In other words, using the
terminology of the second generation models of currency crises, domestic imbalances lead
8 See empirical studies on the importance, during the 1990s, of diverse push and pull factors in Sarno and Taylor
(1997), Montiel and Reinhart (2001), and World Bank (1997).
9 For studies on Latin America and East Asia see Calvo et al. (1993a and b, and 1996), Fernández-Arias and
Montiel (1996), Glick (1998), and more recently Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) and Cardarelli et al. (2010).
10 The “too much of a good thing” literature not only identifies potential negative effects of capital inflows, but also
studies the difficulties in implementing effective policies to prevent such effects.
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the economy to a multiple equilibrium zone; a state with an open door to a vicious circle
between, on the one hand, expectations of default and/or devaluation (and consequent rises
in interest rates) and, on the other hand, the deterioration of financial and/or macroeconomic
conditions. Hence, expectations of default and/or devaluation could become self-fulfilling,
putting an end to capital inflows and/or the fixed exchange rate11.
3.2. Spain: Currency regime, capital inflows, and imbalances
3.2.1. Currency regime and capital inflows
a) Lines of argument from the experience of emerging countries
Following its entry into the EU (1986) and up to the EMS crisis (1993), Spain experienced a
smoother version of the model described above. The peseta became linked to the ECU with
a band – quite wide at the beginning (6%) and stricter after 1989 (2.5%); restrictions on
capital movements were relaxed to reach full liberalization in 1992, and monetary policy was
characterized by a sharp rise in interest rates in an attempt to contain inflation differentials
with EU partners. On this basis, the Spanish economy lived an experience similar to that
described above, ending with financial speculation against the peseta and a sharp
devaluation of the domestic currency12.
That crisis was not only the consequence of domestic problems, but also the result of the
structural weakness of the EMS. Paradoxically, the "solution" to the endogenous fragility of
the EMS model (the Euro) reinforced its most distinctive features: with the Euro, member
economies implemented a model of liberalization of the financial account, fixed exchange
rates, and complete and irreversible loss of sovereignty in the management of monetary
policy. It was certainly an extreme case of the former model, but it apparently shielded
against the risk of a currency crisis.
This enhanced model met – as in the case of emerging economies in the 1990s – optimal
conditions for attracting foreign capital. This attraction stemmed primarily from three sources
common to all cases: (1) exchange rate stability (fixed rates), (2) commitment of
governments to fiscal and monetary stabilization, and (3) financial liberalization and
deregulation. But that was reinforced with the Euro, given: (1) the disappearance of the
exchange rate risk, (2) the elimination in European financial markets of the premium risk on
sovereign debt, with immediate effects on financing conditions in the private sector, and (3)
the integration of the member countries into a new currency zone which had the capacity to
attract capital from the rest of the world.
In turn, these pull factors had a special importance for the Spanish economy, for two
reasons13. First, the novelties introduced by the Euro were greater for peripheral economies,
given that before the monetary union Spain did not enjoy such monetary and fiscal credibility,
nor had it reached the extent of financial liberalization of the core countries. Second, Spain
was actively enjoying an attractive growth cycle when the Euro was put in place. Both of
these factors help explain the asymmetric impact of the enhanced currency model on the
Spanish economy, as compared to other Euro members14.
11 Calvo (1998) and Obstfeld (1994) published theoretical models with financial fragility and the deterioration of
export competitiveness. García (2005) and Olivié (2005), among others, applied those models to the Mexican and
East Asian financial crises.
12 See in Obstfeld (1996) a second-generation model of currency crises applied to the crisis of the European
Monetary System.
13 Veld et al. (2014) consider similar factors to explain the boom-bust cycle in Spain, concluding that “a falling risk
premium, a loosening of collateral constraints for Spanish households and firms, as well as the fall in the interest
rate spread between Spain and the REA [rest of the Euro Area] fuelled the persistent rise in foreign capital flows
to Spain during the boom that preceded the global financial crisis”.
14 When comparing Spain not to other Euro members but to those emerging economies that received capital in
the 1990s, one might wonder how Spain was able to attract so much capital without meeting two conditions –
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b) Empirical support
Between 2001 and 2007, Spain became a major destination for foreign capital. Loans and
portfolio inflows multiplied by more than three (by 3.2), rising from 9% to 19% of GDP and
peaking at 23% in 2006 (Figure 7). As is widely known, both loans and portfolio inflows were
received mostly by private companies (at over 80%, up to 90% in some years), as well as by
financial institutions (between 40% and 70%) and non-financial institutions15 (between 20%
and 50%) (Figure 8).
As a consequence, Spain in 2007 reached seventh position in the Eurozone member
ranking, ordered by size of total portfolio liability positions. Spain’s extra-Eurozone liabilities
grew rapidly between 2001 and 2007 (multiplying by 3.7), behind only Ireland (5.6); the main
suppliers were the U.S. (11%), the UK (7%), and Japan (2.5%) (Figure 9). But the growth of
intra-Eurozone liabilities increased even faster. In particular, between 2001 and 2007,
Spanish portfolio liabilities multiplied by 5.5; again second only to Ireland (8.5) and placing
Spain as the sixth largest debtor to other Eurozone members in 2007. As in other peripheral
countries, the proportion of intra-Eurozone liabilities rose to around 70%, while in the core
countries this share was near or below 50%.
Most of these massive portfolio liabilities were owed to two core countries: Germany (nearly
20%) and France (18%). Far below these, behind even the U.S., ranked Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Ireland, and Belgium (Figure 9). Also remarkable was the overall transfer from
extra-Eurozone creditors to intra-Eurozone core creditors. In just six years (from 2001 to
2007) while the U.S., the UK, and Japan collectively lost 8.8 percentage points, Germany
and France together gained 9.6 points.
The same trends are observable when examining the financial balance and net investment
positions, which illustrate even more clearly Spain’s role as a main destination for intraEurozone capital. Between 2001 and 2007, the joint balance of portfolio investment (PI) and
other investments (OI) multiplied by 6.1, rising from 25,700 to 158,400 million Euros – that is,
from 4% to 15% of GDP (Figure 7).
Financial institutions were systematically the main contributors to this positive net balance,
with net flows of around 5% of GDP in most of the years considered. Non-financial
institutions, however, were the largest contributors to the growth of the financial surplus,
moving from negative net flows in 2002 and 2003 to positive flows, above 10% of GDP, in
2006 and 2007.
Looking at net positions for portfolio investment, Spanish debts were acquired from both
Euro and non-Euro countries, but the former were in 2007 much greater than the latter,
despite having been similar in 2001. During that period, Spain’s extra-Eurozone debtor
position increased only modestly, from 8.4% to 8.9% of GDP, while debt within the Eurozone
rose from 10.0% to 31.3% (Figure 6). The increasing dimension of the net debtor position
within the Eurozone is attributable mainly to those same countries previously singled out as
leading providers of gross liabilities: Germany and France. The net debtor position vis-à-vis
Germany was less than 1% of Spanish GDP in 2001, but 18% in 2007; the same position

competitive fixed exchange rates and high interest rates – that the emerging economies did. First, a relatively
uncompetitive fixed exchange didn’t hamper trust in the country’s ability to repay its foreign debt, probably due to
the “illusion” that the single currency enabled the financing of trade imbalances ad eternum (Torrero, 2010).
Second, low interest rates prevailed not only in Spain, but everywhere, and thus did not preclude capital from
entering the country; indeed, high volumes were required to “offset” the low remuneration of capital.
15 Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs), here referred to as financial institutions, include the central banks of the
Eurozone countries, credit institutions, money market funds, and other financial enterprises. Non-financial
institutions, often termed Other Sectors in statistics, include non-financial corporations, households, non-profit
organizations, and so on.
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with respect to France rose from 3% to 14%. Behind these countries, only the net debt
position with the U.S. stood at a significant level (9% of GDP) in 2007.
In sum, Spain was able to attract large amounts of capital (gross and net), mediated by
Spanish financial institutions (and, to a lesser extent, by non-financial companies), and
increasingly from two large Euro economies. These two economies, Germany and France,
were in turn attracting large amounts of capital (gross and net) from outside the monetary
area. In other words, using Wade’s metaphor (2000), who described the Asian crisis as the
result of a “wheels within wheels” mechanism (the wheels of domestic credit intermediation
within international capital movements), it may be said that Spain experienced a mechanism
of “wheels within wheels within wheels”, since it was intermediating capital drawn from the
Eurozone which, in turn, attracted capital from the rest of the world.
3.2.2. Capital inflows and imbalances
With different emphases, many authors have explained the Spanish crisis as the
consequence of diverse domestic imbalances. Here we argue that financial and
macroeconomic imbalances in Spain were not very different from those economies
mentioned in the previous section as experiencing “too much of a good thing”. Next, we
briefly review those domestic factors that the Spanish Crisis literature tends to posit as
causing such imbalances; rather than attributing imbalances to the inflow of capital (as does
the “too much of a good thing” strand), this literature tends to find domestic causes for
imbalances and even to sometimes suggest the reverse (imbalances resulting in the need for
foreign capital). We are aware that the presence of large capital inflows, even if highly
volatile, does not in itself prove causality between capital inflows and domestic imbalances.
However, as Wade (2000) has done, we rely on logical arguments and empirical information
to at least suggest causal links between massive capital inflows and increasing domestic
imbalances. We present this information for banking imbalances, and subsequently for trade
imbalances.
Many papers have emphasized financial-banking imbalances as an explanatory factor of the
Spanish crisis. In particular, rising private indebtedness, as well as a clear increase in credit
risk, were observed through the expansion of bank credit (Calvo and Paul, 2009; Alonso and
Blázquez, 2013). This expansion fed what we have referred to as market and liquidity risks,
since a growing share of credit went toward financing a housing bubble16 (increasing the risk
of a sharp downfall on the price of the collateral), along with the building sector (whose
returns are long term and dependent on the housing bubble), and public investments (fiscal
income also being highly sensitive to the boom in the real estate sector). Finally, easy credit
explains, at least in part, the emergence of asset bubbles, whose returns were required by
many non-financial institutions in order to cope with their financial debts.
Obviously there are many domestic factors that feed excessive domestic risk-taking. Overintermediation of credit by banks was undoubtedly supported by the credit demand of
companies and households, and this demand was in turn fueled by increasing returns on
investments and relatively high employment levels. Moreover, politicians and civil servants
helped strengthen lending through public spending, fiscal stimuli, and lax banking
supervision. In any case, we contend that easy access to foreign financing was at least a
prerequisite, if not a reinforcing factor, for both excessive borrowing and excessive lending by
financial institutions.
Regarding excessive foreign borrowing, the increase in banks’ foreign debt indeed facilitated
a credit expansion within Spain that would have been unthinkable if supported by domestic
liabilities alone. In fact, "(...) there was a radical change in the intermediation of financial
16 On the channeling of credit to consumption and real estate investment see, for instance, Bernardos
Domínguez (2009), and Alonso and Blázquez (2013).
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resources. (...) No longer were resources drawn from households savings, toward companies
and other borrowers; it was the rest of the world that became the provider of savings, which
financial institutions intermediated toward non-financial institutions and households" (Calvo
and Paul, 2009: 68)17.
And the risky intermediation of foreign liabilities can be better understood in light of incoming
capital. The sheer size of capital inflows may have fed financial instability “Minsky-style”.
Also, financial capital inflows (PI and OI) had a high degree of liquidity, facilitating liquidity
risks (more "traditional" banking liabilities, such as deposits, although also liquid, show a
higher degree of stability)18. Perhaps more importantly, the geographic origin of flows –
Germany and France (gross and net) and the Netherlands (gross) – may have led to Spanish
actors to incur higher financial risks due to confidence in the stability of inflows. Said
confidence probably stemmed from the fact that the lending economies, in particular
Germany and the Netherlands, enjoyed increasing current balances and therefore appeared
to have continuous financing capacity. In other words, stability of funds was presumed by
obviating the international debt chains and the possible contagion risk suggested by gross
liabilities in core countries (Wyplosz, 2010; Obstfeld, 2012). Finally, the increasingly
European origin of financing to Spain probably increased trust in implicit public guarantees to
the exchange rate regime.
Focusing now on trade imbalances, we note that, just as with financial imbalances, problems
of competitiveness are widely considered as possible explanatory factors for the crisis. Partly
in response to a branch of literature that was focused on fiscal problems in the countries of
Southern Europe, a series of analyses instead emphasized trade imbalances within the
Eurozone (e.g., Arestis and Gutiérrez, 2009; Giavazzi and Spaventa, 2010). Other studies
defined the crisis not only as a balance-of-payments crisis, but found an origin in productive
imbalances (e.g., Gracia Santos, 2012; Álvarez et al., 2013).
Again, it is difficult to disentangle whether foreign capital came to finance a trade deficit,
already gestated domestically (via lower competitiveness of exports and greater demand for
imports), or whether (inverting the causality) easy access to foreign capital contributed to the
deterioration of trade balances. Without denying the former, we here emphasize the latter,
again in view of the over-intermediation of foreign funds. In particular, access to foreign
capital allowed banks to expand credit – and non-financial institutions to obtain funds – which
in turn: fueled external consumption (Spain’s domestic demand rose clearly above that of its
trade partners); provoked a loss of price competitiveness, via an increasing inflation gap (that
is, a real appreciation of the exchange rate); and motivated the deviation of credit from
tradable activities towards non-tradable sectors. As in Álvarez et al. (2013), credit to nontradables may have produced a crowding out effect on exportable goods, as this credit was
being channeled not to productive activities with the ability to compete internationally, but to
activities whose profitability depended on the sustainability of the upward financial cycle
(Reis, 2013).

17 We find the same idea in Borio et al. (2011) and Lane (2013: 11): “the ability of banks to rise external debt
funding allowed domestic lending growth to outstrip domestic deposit growth, which also supported the strong
momentum in domestic property prices in some high-deficit countries”.
18 Lane (2013: 4) makes this same point, in particular for Ireland: “the Irish banking crisis was deepened by
external financial activities… issuing foreign liabilities to fund foreign claims may also facilitate poorly-managed
banks to take on excessive risks in particular sectors (real estate)”.
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4. Conclusions
This work was inspired by the perceived causal relationships between currency regimes and
massive capital inflows, and between massive capital inflows and financial crises, as
established in the “global imbalances” literature (referring to the U.S.) and in the “too much of
a good thing” literature (referring to emerging economies). Despite Spain’s and other
Eurozone countries’ use of currency regimes similar to those in the U.S. and said emerging
economies – simultaneously, thanks to monetary unification – and although Spain did indeed
receive massive capital inflows prior to its crisis, we feel that the causal relationships
indicated above have not been sufficiently analyzed in most narratives on the Spanish crisis.
In order to try to apply those two strands of literature to the Eurozone crisis (with a focus on
Spain), this work has sought to: (1) show similarities between the monetary and exchange
rate regimes in the Eurozone and the U.S., in roughly the decade prior to the outbreak of the
financial crisis; and similarities between exchange rate regimes in Spain (and other
peripheral Euro countries) and emerging economies in the 1990s, in the years before their
respective financial crises; (2) explain (employing arguments from the literature and data on
capital movements) capital inflows into the Eurozone, and their subsequent channeling into
Spain, by virtue of the interaction of two coexisting exchange rate regimes, for the Eurozone
as a whole and for Spain; and (3) present certain domestic imbalances in Spain – banking
fragility and trade deterioration – as products of a massive inflow of capital from abroad.
We have endeavored to argue that domestic imbalances (and ultimately the crisis) in Spain
can be explained through the “wheels within wheels within wheels” mechanism at play:
"wheels" of domestic credit intermediation in Spain that moved the "wheels" of capital inflows
from the Eurozone, propelled in turn by the" wheels" of international capital entering Europe
– expanding on the analyisis of Wade (2000) regarding the East Asian crisis.
From here it strikes us as necessary to explore appropriate empirical methodologies for
delving into the directions of causality between currency models and capital inflows, on the
one hand, and between capital inflows and domestic imbalances, on the other. Empirical
analyses are also required to improve the quality and quantity of data regarding portfolio
capital and lending positions.
In any case, we believe that, even in absence of stronger empirical studies, this work has
served its purpose in suggesting relevant policy implications around international financial
relations and economic crises. These implications are not dissimilar from those discovered in
prior analyses of crises in emerging economies, indicating a need to acknowledge the
dangers of certain currency regimes in terms of domestic imbalances as resulting from
financial integration, and voluminous capital inflows.
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Figures
Figure 1: Eurozone PI and OI joint balances, % of GDP, 1999-2010
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Note: Data for total balance correspond to Eurozone-12; data for balance vis-à-vis extraEurozone correspond to Eurozone-16.
Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from Eurostat.
Figure 2: Net portfolio positions, intra- and extra-Eurozone, in millions of US dollars,
2001 and 2007
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Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from CPIS.
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Figure 3: Gross inflow of PI and OI in the Eurozone, % of GDP, 1999-2010
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Note: Data for total gross inflows correspond to Eurozone-12; data for gross inflows from
extra-Eurozone correspond to Eurozone-16.
Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from Eurostat.
Figure 4: Share of countries in gross PI liabilities, intra- and extra-Eurozone, % of
Eurozone-12 total, 2001 and 2007
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Figure 5: Share of intra- and extra-Eurozone in gross PI liabilities, % of individual
country totals, 2001 and 2007
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Note: Total data corresponds to Eurozone-12.
Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from CPIS.
Figure 6: Share of sectors in PI and OI inflows, % of total Eurozone-12, 2001-2007
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Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from Eurostat.
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Figure 7: Spain, gross PI and OI inflow, and PI and OI joint balance, % of GDP, 1998 to
2012
25
Joint PI and OI balance

Gross PI and OI inflows

20

15

10

5

0

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

-5

Source: Authors’ elaboration, with data from Eurostat.
Figure 8: Share of sectors in PI and OI inflows, % of Spain’s total, 1998 to 2012
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Figure 9: Share of countries in gross PI liabilities, % of Spain’s total, 2001 and 2007
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